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• Participants viewed video of a person building a block
tower, after which the agent (human, robot) knocked the
tower over.
• Participants rated acceptability, deservingness of
punishment, and act intentionality ('on purpose' or 'on
accident').
• 'Culpability scores' were computed as the difference
between acceptibility and punishment.
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• 3-year-olds (n=32,M=3.60 years, SD=.58)
• 5-year-olds(n=31, M=5.55 years, SD=.33)
METHOD + RESULTS
This study examined children’s judgments of intentionality and culpability of human and
robot agents, in addition to the tendency to anthropomorphize.
• Perceiving intentionality for another’s actions can influence moral judgment [1].
• Previous work has demonstrated infants’ ability to differentiate that humans have intentions and
mechanical devices do not [2].
• However, perceiving personified technology (such as robots) as social beings has been evidenced
when the robot is behaving in a socially contingent manner [3].
INTRODUCTION METHOD + RESULTS
Three- and five-year-olds viewed a robot as intentional and morally culpable for its actions, and
these attributions were tied to their tendency to anthropomorphize.
• Children inferred the robot had intentions to the same degree as humans.
• Although culpability for the agent's actions was tied to intentionality (I.e., acting on purpose),
children viewed the robot as less culpable than the human.
• Children with greater tendency to anthropomorphize were more likely to judge the robot, but not
the human, as morally culpable.
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* F(3, 45)=5.56, p=.002, ηp2=.27; Error bars = SD
Figure 1. Proportion of participants who pulled dumbbell apart (excluding those who did not touch the dumbbell).
Figure 2. Mean judgments on Tower Task.
DUMBBELL TASK
• Participants viewed video of either a human or a robot
(socially contingent or non-contingent) attempting to
pull a wooden dumbbell apart, but failing to do so.
• Dumbbell was placed in front of the participant to see
if they would imitate the intended-but-failed action.
• If children understood the agent (human or robot) as
intentional, they should complete the intended-but-
failed action.
TOWER TASK
• Participants were given the Individual
Differences in Anthropomorphism Questionnaire
- Child Form (IDAQ-CF) [4].
• IDAQ-CF assessed attribution of internal states
(e.g., intentions, thought, and emotions) to non-
human animals, nature, and technology.
ANTHROPOMORPHISM Punishment Culpability
IDAQ-CF .51** .39**
Figure 4. Correlations between anthropomorphism
and judgments of punishment and culpability for the
robot.










































* p < .05
Figure 3. Mean scores on Tower Task by intention
judgment ('on purpose' or 'on accident').
